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T
he Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria 
(“the Global Fund”) was 
created to ﬁ  ght three of the world’s 
most devastating diseases. Since its 
creation in 2002, it has struggled 
with the difﬁ  cult task of focusing on 
three diseases, and at the same time 
supporting the fragile public health 
systems that are supposed to implement 
this ﬁ  ght on the ground. 
Recent internal comments from the 
Global Fund suggest an intention to 
focus more on the three diseases, and 
to leave the strengthening of health 
systems and support for the health 
workforce to others. This could create 
a “Medicines without Doctors” situation 
in which the medicines to ﬁ  ght AIDS, 
tuberculosis, and malaria are available, 
but not the doctors or the nurses to 
prescribe those medicines adequately. 
We believe that this would be a 
strategic mistake, as the Global Fund 
has an advantage that makes it a 
key actor in the ﬁ  eld of supporting 
health workforces. Most other donors 
are forced to aim for sustainability 
in the conventional sense (implying 
that beneﬁ  ciary countries should 
gradually replace international 
funding with domestic resources); 
the Global Fund has been promised 
sustained funding by the international 
community, allowing it to make 
sustained commitments to beneﬁ  ciary 
countries. This is what some of the 
countries most affected by AIDS, 
tuberculosis, and malaria need to 
increase their health workforce. Their 
health workforce challenges are too 
big to consider a gradual replacement 
of international funding with domestic 
resources. 
We also believe that the debate about 
this intention should be public, and we 
hope to launch the public debate with 
this article. 
We use the examples of two 
countries—Mozambique and Malawi—
trying to ﬁ  ght against a full-blown AIDS 
epidemic with a fragile health system, 
to underline the crucial role of Global 
Fund support to the health workforce. 
The Health Workforce Gap 
in Mozambique
The World Health Organization 
estimates that to achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), health systems need at 
least 2.5 health workers per 1,000 
people [1]. In Mozambique, there 
are 514 doctors, 3,954 nurses, and 
2,229 midwives: per 1,000 people 
there are 0.36 full-time equivalents 
of health workers (2004 ﬁ  gures) [2]. 
Mozambique’s health workforce would 
have to be multiplied by seven to 
achieve the MDGs.
To roll out antiretroviral 
therapy (ART) across the country, 
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Mozambique estimates that it would 
need eight health workers per 1,000 
patients receiving ART [3]. This 
is in line with the estimations of 
Hirschhorn et al.: the numbers of 
health workers required to provide 
ART to 1,000 patients include one to 
two physicians, two to seven nurses, 
one to three pharmacy staff, and 
a wide range of counsellors and 
treatment supporters [3]. These 
ﬁ  ndings apply to ART programmes 
in their start-up phase, which require 
an intensive follow-up, but even if a 
mature ART programme could be 
effective with only four health workers 
per 1,000 patients, the number of 
additional health workers required 
remains a huge challenge, knowing 
that 199,000 people in Mozambique 
needed ART by the end of 2005 [4].
Is Mozambique’s health workforce 
gap exceptional? There are 12 
countries in Africa with an HIV 
prevalence of more than 5% and less 
than two nurses per 1,000 people (see 
Table 1). If we rank these countries 
according to density of nurses, 
Mozambique comes last. In terms of 
expanding access to ART, no country 
faces a bigger health workforce crisis 
than Mozambique. 
The Health Workforce Gap 
in Malawi 
In Malawi, there are 266 doctors and 
7,264 nurses (no ﬁ  gures on midwives 
are available): per 1,000 people there 
are 0.61 full-time equivalents of health 
workers (2004 ﬁ  gures) [5]. The health 
workforce would need to be multiplied 
by four to achieve the MDGs.
In 2004, Peter Piot, head of the 
Joint United Nations Programme on 
HIV/AIDS, and Suma Chakrabarti, 
permanent secretary of the United 
Kingdom Department for International 
Development, during a joint visit to 
Malawi concluded that it would be 
impossible to roll out ART without 
undermining the health system, unless 
the level of health workers could be 
increased dramatically. They instructed 
their agencies to support an initiative 
to address the health workforce crisis. 
The result was “a shift from piecemeal 
donor support for a number of 
uncoordinated initiatives to a more 
comprehensive approach” [6]. 
The response in Malawi might remain 
unique for several reasons. First, the 
Malawi response was possible because 
of an explicit decision by donors “to 
consider measures that might otherwise 
be dismissed as unsustainable” because 
of the scale of the crisis [6]. It is not 
clear how serious a health workforce 
crisis needs to be for donors to consider 
“unsustainable” measures. 
Second, Malawi was able to come 
to a special agreement with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Malawi agreed to a ceiling on the 
“government wage bill” with the IMF 
in September 2003. In July 2005, the 
IMF accepted that the ceiling “will 
be adjusted upward ([or] downward) 
by the full amount of donor-funded 
supplementary wages and salaries for 
the health sector that is greater ([or] 
less) than the program baseline” [7]. 
All countries listed in Table 1 have 
agreed with the IMF to control their 
wage bill—either as a performance 
criterion or benchmark, or as a 
promise in a “Letter of Intent”—except 
for Zimbabwe and Côte d’Ivoire, 
which do not have ongoing IMF-
supported programmes. Malawi is 
the only country beneﬁ  ting from an 
automatic adjustment of this ceiling. 
The IMF justiﬁ  es these ceilings 
because of “concerns about potential 
macroeconomic problems that could 
result from entering into long-term 
expenditure commitments without 
long-term donor commitments to 
ﬁ  nance them” [8]. 
In addition, Malawi obtained 
funding from the Global Fund under 
its Fifth Call for Proposals. The 
Board of the Global Fund decided to 
consider health systems strengthening 
(HSS) interventions for funding as 
a speciﬁ  c category under its Fifth 
Call for Proposals, and it was as an 
HSS intervention that the Malawi 
response was approved. But under the 
Sixth Call for Proposals, speciﬁ  c HSS 
interventions were no longer eligible. 
Global Fund Support to the Health 
Workforce
The Global Fund has a unique 
governance structure. At the core 
of this structure are the Country 
Coordination Mechanisms (CCMs): 
national platforms of stakeholders, 
formulating proposals in answer to 
the calls for proposals launched by the 
Board of the Global Fund. (The Board 
of the Global Fund regularly launches 
calls for proposals, known as Rounds: 
Round 1 and Round 2 were launched 
in 2002, Round 3 in 2003 and so forth. 
Round 7 was launched in March 2007.)
These proposals are reviewed by 
the Technical Review Panel (TRP), 
a panel of independent experts. The 
TRP recommends certain proposals for 
funding to the Board.
The Global Fund’s Board includes 
representatives of donor and recipient 
governments, non-governmental 
organisations, the private sector, and 
affected communities. It approves 
proposals upon recommendation from 
the TRP. It also approves the guidelines 
and the proposal forms for each of the 
Rounds of the Global Fund. 
The Secretariat is the executive 
branch of the Global Fund. In 
principle, it does not interfere with 
the approval process. In practice, it 
does elaborate the guidelines and the 
proposal forms, and thus it has an 
inﬂ  uence on the eligibility of proposals. 
For an intervention to be eligible, 
it needs to be proposed by a CCM, 
recommended by the TRP, approved 
by the Board, and it must ﬁ  t within 
the guidelines and proposal forms 
proposed by the Secretariat.
As an illustration of the complexity 
of this governance structure, we could 
mention the initial uncertainty about 
the eligibility of AIDS treatment 
interventions. During the ﬁ  rst Board 
meeting, the Health Minister of 
France said that “there should be 
no false dilemma over treatment or 
prevention”, but did not receive a 
clear answer from the Board [9]. Then 
CCMs proposed ART interventions, the 
TRP recommended some of them, and 
the Board approved them. 
By doing so, the Global Fund has 
developed—perhaps implicitly—a 
novel approach to sustainability. 
Sustainability in the conventional 
sense implies that beneﬁ  ciary 
countries gradually replace foreign 
assistance with domestic resources. 
This is not realistic for low-income 
countries providing ART. Nonetheless, 
the Global Fund does support 
ART interventions in low-income 
countries: thus it shifted concerns 
about sustainability from national to 
international level (if the Global Fund 
can sustain these interventions, they 
are sustainable, albeit in a different 
manner).
The international community 
endorsed this novel approach. In 
June 2006, the United Nations 
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General Assembly committed itself “to 
supporting and strengthening existing 
ﬁ  nancial mechanisms, including 
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria, as well as 
relevant United Nations organizations, 
through the provision of funds in a 
sustained manner” (emphasis added) 
[10]. It might sound like a nuance, but 
the difference between “sustainability 
relying on domestic resources in the 
long run” and “sustainability relying 
on the provision of external funds in a 
sustained manner” is fundamental. 
This novel approach is what 
countries like Mozambique need to 
strengthen their workforce. They 
need to hire more health workers, but 
they are unable to sustain the costs of 
hiring additional health workers with 
domestic resources. 
If the controversy about ART was 
easy to solve, the controversy about 
strengthening health workforces was 
tougher. Some Global Fund supporters 
understood from the beginning that 
its success in expanding coverage 
of ART depended on its willingness 
to pay for the salaries of additional 
health workers. However, the Global 
Fund has never been keen to expand 
its novel approach to sustainability to 
the funding of the health workforce. 
Since Round 2, the Global Fund has 
applied strict criteria for the funding of 
salaries of health workers. With regards 
to salaries, applicants must explain 
“how these salaries will be sustained 
after the proposal period is over” [11]. 
Dräger et al. note that this concern 
about sustainability “cannot be found 
for any other activities ﬁ  nanced by 
the Global Fund” and suspect that it is 
closely linked to IMF and World Bank 
macroeconomic policies [11].
The advocates of supporting salaries 
of health workers from the Global 
Fund obtained a short-lived victory 
in 2005, when Round 5 of the Global 
Fund included a speciﬁ  c category for 
HSS interventions. 
But Round 5 also caused some actors 
to evaluate their role in the global 
health landscape. The World Bank 
insisted on a “Comparative Advantage 
Study” of Global Fund and World 
Bank AIDS programmes. Alexander 
Shakow, who conducted the study, 
recommended that the Global Fund 
focus on disease-speciﬁ  c interventions, 
leaving HSS interventions to the 
World Bank [12]. In January 2006, 
the Global AIDS Alliance and Health 
GAP—supported by more than 30 
experts and 300 non-governmental 
organisations—urged the Global 
Fund to keep HSS interventions as 
a speciﬁ  c category [13,14]. In April 
2006, the Board decided to narrow 
the scope of eligible interventions, 
adopting a proposal form that no 
longer included HSS interventions as 
a speciﬁ  c category. In August 2006, 
Richard Feachem, the executive 
director of the Global Fund, endorsed 
a new “division of labour” between 
the World Bank and the Global Fund: 
rapid scale-up of disease-speciﬁ  c 
programmes for the Global Fund 
and long-term development of health 
infrastructure for the World Bank 
[15]. In November 2006, the TRP and 
the Secretariat, in their report to the 
Board, recommended that “the Board 
convene a suitable forum, which can 
discuss and attempt to resolve the 
question of the appropriate scope 
and deﬁ  nition of acceptable HSS 
activities prior to Round 7. Ideally, this 
discussion will lead to a clariﬁ  cation 
and narrowing of the scope of HSS 
activities which the Global Fund sees as 
its mandate to fund” [16].
This evolution is problematic 
because the World Bank does not share 
the Global Fund’s novel approach to 
sustainability, certainly not for health 
workers’ salaries. The World Bank 
believes that “it is not prudent for 
countries to commit to permanent 
expenditures for such items as salaries 
for nurses and doctors on the basis 
of uncertain ﬁ  nancing ﬂ  ows from 
development assistance funds” [17].
Some bilateral donors might be 
willing to consider “unsustainable” 
interventions to address health 
workforce crises, as they did in Malawi. 
But Malawi remains the exception that 
conﬁ  rms the general rule. Bilateral 
donors will ﬁ  nd it difﬁ  cult to make 
their commitments reliable enough 
for the IMF to adjust the ceiling on the 
government wage bill. Most bilateral 
donors can only commit for as long as 
their government remains in place—
only a few years. 
Table 1. Health Workforce Gaps and Wage Bill Agreements in 13 African Countries
Countries with Adult HIV 
Prevalence >5% and <2 Nurses 
per 1,000 Population 
Nurses (Density per 
1,000 Population), 
2004
Physicians 
(Density per 1,000 
Population), 2004
Adult HIV 
Prevalence 
(%), 2005
Wage Bill Conditionality in IMF-Supported 
Programmes
Zambia 1.74 0.12 17.0 Yes
Cameroon 1.60 0.19 5.4 No, but government promised to keep wage bill 
below 5.9% of GDP (December 2, 2003)
Kenya 1.14 0.14 6.1 Yes
Congo, Republic of 0.96 0.20 5.3 Yes
Zimbabwe 0.72 0.16 20.1 No ongoing IMF-supported programmes
Lesotho 0.62 0.05 23.2 No, but government promised to reduce wage bill 
(February 12, 2001)
Uganda 0.61 0.08 6.7 Yes
Côte d’Ivoire 0.60 0.12 7.1 No ongoing IMF-supported programmes
Malawi 0.59 0.02 14.1 Yes, but with automatic adjustment
Tanzania 0.37 0.02 6.5 No, but government promised to keep wage bill 
below 4.7% of GDP (July 14, 2005)
Central African Republic 0.30 0.08 10.7 Yes
Mozambique 0.21 0.03 16.1 No longer applicable since 2006, but replaced by 
promise to keep wage bill below 7.5% (April 3, 2006) 
GDP, gross domestic product.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040128.t001
April 2007  |  Volume 4  |  Issue 4  |  e128PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0608
Conclusion
Both the cases of Mozambique 
and Malawi illustrate the crucial 
importance of addressing the health 
workforce crisis. It is easier to remedy 
the shortage of medicines with 
external funding than it is to remedy 
the shortage of health workers with 
external funding. Medicines can be 
bought; health workers need to be 
trained ﬁ  rst. This underlines the 
importance of starting emergency 
human resources programmes now, 
before the growing case load—
resulting from the fact that most 
people on ART will stay alive longer, 
while the number of people in need 
of ART will grow—undermines either 
the quality of ART programmes, or the 
performance of health systems [18]. 
Without support from the 
Global Fund, it will be difﬁ  cult 
for Mozambique to develop its 
own emergency human resources 
programme. Bilateral donors are 
unable to support human resources 
programmes that rely on sustained 
external assistance over decades. The 
World Bank is unwilling to use foreign 
assistance for salaries of health workers. 
The IMF is unwilling to stretch ceilings 
on wage bills, because commitments 
from bilateral donors are unreliable. 
Without ﬂ  exibility about these ceilings, 
bilateral donors cannot support salaries 
of doctors and nurses, even if they want 
to. It is a vicious circle.
The Global Fund is probably the 
only actor able to break through this 
vicious circle. It is the only donor 
mechanism that beneﬁ  ts from an 
explicit endorsement from the 
international community to practice a 
novel approach to sustainability. 
But donors must give the Global 
Fund the resources to do so. As one 
of us argued in a previous article, it 
is feasible to turn the Global Fund 
into a world health insurance, funded 
by rich countries in accordance with 
their wealth, and creating rights for 
poor countries to obtain assistance 
in accordance with their needs [19]. 
It would allow individual donors to 
overcome their inability to make 
commitments beyond the term of 
their governments, because their 
contributions would be compulsory. 
(This is not a heresy. Many bilateral 
donors consider their contributions to 
the World Bank as compulsory [20]. 
This can be achieved for contributions 
to the Global Fund.) Furthermore, the 
pooling of resources by many donors 
would increase continuity: if one donor 
reduces its contribution, another donor 
could compensate. 
And that is exactly what countries 
like Mozambique need to increase their 
health workforce: sustained assistance.  
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